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FAMILY LAW
Randall A. Snyder and Susan R. Sharrock
I. Introduction
The field of family law in Montana is replete with new develop-
ments. Three new acts passed within the last four years direct judi-
cial decision-making regarding families-to-be, on-going families,
and the dissolution of the family unit. They are the Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act (hereinafter UMDA),' enacted in 1975; the
act concerning abused, neglected, and dependent children or
youth,2 enacted in 1974; and the Montana Youth Court Act,3 en-
acted in 1974. Numerous first interpretations of the new statutes
appear in recent decisions of the Montana Supreme Court.
This survey focuses primarily on decisions of the supreme court
made between October 1, 1977, and October 1, 1978. 4 Analysis of
the cases is divided into two major categories: (1) decisions affect-
ing the relationship between husband and wife, and (2) those
affecting the relationship between parent and child. The first cate-
gory includes decisions under the UMDA regarding property dis-
position, maintenance, and child support following dissolution of
marriage. The second category includes decisions on child custody
following a dissolution of marriage or a judicial finding of child
abuse, dependency or neglect, and decisions relating to adoption
and youth court proceedings.
II. HUSBAND-WIFE RELATIONSHIPS
A. Property Disposition
Dissolution decrees dividing marital property between spouses
have been the basis for most of the appeals under the UMDA. The
four issues forming the basis for appealed property dispositions are:
(1) what is "marital property;" (2) how is the marital estate proved;
(3) what is an equitable distribution of the marital estate; and
(4) what is the relationship between divided property and
maintenance?
1. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 40-1-101 to 404 (1978)
(formerly codified at REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947],
§ 48-301 to 341 (Supp. 1977)).
2. MCA §§ 41-3-101 to 504 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, §§ 10-1300 to 1322
(Supp. 1977)).
3. MCA §§ 41-5-101 to 924 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, §§ 10-1200 to 1252
(Supp. 1977)).
4. For a recent overview of family law in Montana see Mahan, Recent Developments
in Family Law in Montana, 39 MONT. L. Rev. 1 (1978).
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1. Marital Property
The UMDA empowers the district judge to divide property
"whether title is in either or both spouses' name, and regardless of
when the property was acquired." 5 This conforms with case law
prior to the act, where the Montana court held that district judges
could as a matter of equity divide marital property in a divorce
action regardless of who held title.'
The discretionary power of the district judge under the UMDA
was challenged in Hebel v. Hebel, where the appellant was divested
of certain "premarital property."7 The marriage lasted only eighteen
months, and there was a wide disparity in assets prior to the mar-
riage. Nonetheless, the supreme court upheld the decree, giving
force to the judge's power to dispose of "any or all property, however
acquired or held." s Such broad discretion is somewhat unique. Mon-
tana, Washington, and Indiana are the only three of the seven juris-
dictions having passed the Uniform Act' that so empower district
judges.'0
Gifts to and inheritance by individual spouses are also included
in a property disposition in Montana's Act." The statute is silent,
however, on how a judge is to dispose of such gifts and inheritance.
In Vivian v. Vivian,'2 the district judge had awarded the husband
the family home, but deducted from its value the husband's inheri-
tance of $13,726.15. Observing that there was no evidence the money
was used to improve the home or increase its value, the supreme
court reversed the decree. The court upheld the judge's statutory
power to consider inheritance, but it affirmatively declined to make
any rule regarding its disposition. 3 Thus, the court held, inheritance
5. MCA § 40-4-202 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-321 (Supp. 1977)).
6. Cook v. Cook, 159 Mont. 98, 495 P.2d 591 (1972).
7. - Mont. _ 578 P.2d 591 (1978).
8. Id. at -, 578 P.2d at 593.
9. Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act [hereinafter cited as UMDAJ, National Draft,
9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as U.L.A.] 415-516 (1973).
10. Indiana provides that a court "shall divide the property whether owned by either
spouse prior to marriage, acquired by either. . . after the marriage. . . or acquired by their
joint efforts ... " IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11 (Burns) (1978 Supp.). In Washington, both
the separate estates of the spouses and the community property of the marriage are considera-
tions in a property division. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080 (1977 Supp.). Arizona's
version is significantly amended from the national draft, see 9 U.L.A. 360 (1977 Supp.), and
divides the marital estate according to community property law. Awiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-
318 (1978 Supp.). Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, and Missouri all expressly assign a spouse's
individual property to that spouse. COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1976 Supp.); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 40, § 503 (1977 Supp.); Ky. Rav. STAT. 403.190(1) (1978 Supp.); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.330
(Vernon 1978 Supp.).
11. MCA § 40-4-202 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-321 (Supp. 1977)).
12. - Mont. ., 583 P.2d 1072 (1978).
13. Citing Morse v. Morse, - Mont. - , 571 P.2d 1147 (1977).
[Vol. 40
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is to be considered and divided based on the particular facts of each
case. 14
Morse v. Morse5 presented issues of present and future inheri-
tance. Before the petition for dissolution, the appellant's wife had
received $200,000 from her deceased father. She also stood to receive
an additional inheritance at the time of the proceeding from her
aging mother. The record was unclear whether the $200,000 was
considered part of the marital estate, and the district court did not
consider the possibility of any future inheritance. The justices unan-
imously concurred that it was reversible error not to have considered
the received inheritance." Only a majority, however, refused to
grant the appellant's request that his wife's future inheritance also
be considered. 7 A received inheritance, then, must be considered in
a property disposition. Reasoning that future inheritances are too
speculative, the court ruled in Morse that they cannot be consid-
ered. 8
Justice Harrison, joined by Justice Daly, dissented in Morse,
because the wife had already received a sizeable inheritance from
her deceased father, her mother was eighty-two and in poor health,
and the wife's parents maintained a mutual will." The dissent is
persuasive for an equitable result, and on the facts in Morse, the
wife's potential inheritance appears all but certain. Nevertheless,
Justice Harrison failed to give any indication as to how a future
inheritance should be divided, just as the majority opinion failed to
offer guidance in dividing an existing inheritance.
As to existing assets and liabilities, the Montana court is unani-
mous in requiring that all the parties' property be considered." In
Martinez v. Martinez,2 certain real property in Mexico held by the
parties was omitted. The court reversed the property disposition,
stating that the trial judge is required to consider the entire estate,
including all assets and liabilities, in making a property disposi-
tion.1
2. Proving the Marital Estate
In order to meet the requirement that all marital property be
14. - Mont. at -, 583 P.2d at 1074-75.
15. - Mont. -, 571 P.2d 1147 (1977).
16. Id. at __, 571 P.2d at 1149.
17. Id. at _--. 571 P.2d at 1152 (Harrison, J., dissenting in part).
18. Id. at __, 571 P.2d at 1149.
19. Id. at -, 571 P.2d at 1150 et seq. (Harrison, J., dissenting in part).
20. See Martinez v. Martinez, - Mont. -- , 573 P.2d 670 (1977). Accord, Howland
v. Howland, 337 N.E.2d 728 (Ind. App. 1976).
21. - Mont. _ 573 P.2d 667 (1977).
22. Id. at 670.
19791
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considered, the Montana Supreme Court demands proof of the mar-
ital estate. Testimony and documents must be introduced setting
out the parties' assets and liabilities.23 This demand was not met in
Martinez, where the parties testified as to amounts in bank ac-
counts without introducing any corroborative physical evidence,
such as bank books, and where the court failed to use assessed
property values.' The supreme court held that insufficient evidence
of the estate and failure to consider assessed values constitute re-
versible error. "5
In Dahl v. Dahl,"s the court went on to say that evidence must
be recent" as well as reliable. In Dahl, the sole evidence of the
husband's business assets and income consisted of uncertified finan-
cial statements and tax returns antedating the decree by two years.
Such evidence, the court held, was insufficient to prove the true
value of the marital estate.?
A casual reading of the statutes and cases under the UMDA
discloses the broad discretion a district judge has in a dissolution
proceeding. Because of this, the supreme court requires fact findings
by the judge to justify legal conclusions.2 Reilly v. Reillyl" directed
the trial court to make findings on each element to be considered
under what is now MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED (hereinafter cited as
MCA) § 40-4-202 (1978),' but Caprice v. Caprice2 seems to limit
Reilly, holding that separate findings are desirable, but unneces-
sary:
[Tihis Court requires specific findings to insure an adequate re-
cord for appellate review so that the unhealthy situation of specu-
lation as to reasons for findings and conclusions on appellate re-
view will not occur .... Admittedly the district court here did not
make an item by item finding based on the pertinent factors in
[MCA § 40-4-202 (1978)] (though it would have been laudable
had it done so) ....




26. - Mont. -, 577 P.2d 1230 (1978).
27. Id.
28. Id. See also Kramer v. Kramer, - Mont. -, 580 P.2d 840 (1978). But see
Eppley v. Eppley, 341 N.E.2d 212 (Ind. App. 1976) (not improper for trial court to base
property values on appraisals made seventeen months earlier at time of separation).
29. See generally Berthiaume v. Berthiaume, - Mont. _ 567 P.2d 1388 (1977).
30. - Mont. _, 577 P.2d 840 (1978).
31. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-321 (Supp. 1977).
32. - Mont. _ 585 P.2d 641 (1978).
33. Id. at _ 585 P.2d at 644.
[Vol. 40
4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 40 [1979], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol40/iss1/4
FAMILY LAW
202, the less chance there is for reversal on appeal. As evidence
forms the basis for a judge's findings, it is the quality and suffi-
ciency of evidence which safeguards a property disposition.
3. Equitable Distribution
Before district judges acquired authority under the UMDA to
distribute marital property, the supreme court followed the rule
that "[a] trial judge's resolution of a property division in a divorce
action is fettered only by range of reason, and his judgement will
not be disturbed in absence of abuse of discretion. '3 This same
theme appears in cases decided under the new act.3 Generally, the
court will reverse a decree only where the judge "acted without the
employment of conscientious judgement, or if he exceeded the
bounds of reason in view of all the circumstances."-" The following
cases illustrate particular rulings on the issue of equity.
In Zell v. Zell,37 the court affirmed an equal division of property
where the district judge found an equal contribution to the marital
estate. In Kramer v. Kramer,3 however, it reversed as inequitable
a decree awarding the wife all the personal and real property and
leaving the husband his truck and all the liabilities of the marriage.
The appellant in Morse challenged the property disposition as ine-
quitable because the district judge did not consider "fault" in the
marital breakdown .3 The court summarily rejected this argument,
ruling that fault cannot be considered in any part of the dissolution
proceeding. 0 Clearly, this was the only decision possible in light of
the statutory prohibition against fault considerations." Nonethe-
less, Montana now has judicial as well as legislative impetus to the
prohibition, a primary thrust of the uniform act. 2
4. Conclusion: Evidence, not Equity, is Controlling
In each of the cases discussed, the supreme court reviewed the
equity or fairness of the resultant property distribution and issued
a ruling based on the particular facts before it. It is apparent that
the Montana court is reluctant to overturn a district judge's decree,
34. Cook v. Cook, 159 Mont. 98, 103, 495 P.2d 591, 593-94 (1972).
35. See, e.g., Berthiaume v. Berthiaume, - Mont. -, 567 P.2d 1388 (1977).
36. Zell v. Zell, _ Mont. -, -, 570 P.2d 33, 35 (1977).
37. - Mont. 570 P.2d 33 (1977).
38. - Mont. 580 P.2d 439 (1978).
39. - Mont. at -, 571 P.2d at 1149.
40. Id. at -, 571 P.2d at 1147.
41. MCA § 40-4-202 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-321 (Supp. 1977)).
42. See Commissioners' Note to UMDA § 307, 9 U.L.A. 492 (1973).
1979]
5
Snyder and Sharrock: Family Law
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1979
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
unless the judge failed to follow statutory guidelines 3 or neglected
to list fact findings supporting the decree." Appeals will likely turn
on the use of statutory guidelines or the sufficiency of justification
in a decree rather than "who received what" and whether the divi-
sion is fair. Even where the equity of a property dispositon is ques-
tionable, the court will uphold a decree if the evidence and fact
findings support the Conclusions reached. 5
It is incumbent upon the attorney to ascertain that all the
property of the marriage and of the spouse represented be consid-
ered and divided by the court. Any omission can be grounds for
appeal and reversal. Equally important is proof of the marital es-
tate. Financial statements should be certified by an accountant,
and tax returns and assessed property values must be current."6 This
survey maintains that the strength of a decreed property disposition
on appeal is determined more by the evidence and fact findings than
by its equity.
5. Property or Maintenance?
Prior to the UMDA, periodic cash payments from an ex-
husband to an ex-wife were called alimony. Now termed
"maintenance, '4 7 such payments are occasionally made part of a
settlement agreement in lieu of liquidating and dividing valuable
marital assets, such as a ranch or corporation, which might only be
done at a loss. 8 The question then arises whether payments are part
of the property disposition or payments of maintenance." The dif-
ference can be critical. A property disposition is not subject to sub-
sequent modification,s" but a maintenance order may be." There are
43. See, e.g., Cromwell v. Cromwell, - Mont. -, 570 P.2d 1129 (1977).
44. See, e.g., Capener v. Capener, - Mont. _-- 582 P.2d 326 (1978).
45. See Caprice v. Caprice, - Mont. - , 585 P.2d 641 (1978).
46. See Martinez v. Martinez, - Mont. - 573 P.2d 670; Kruse v. Kruse, -
Mont. , P.2d -_, 35 St. Rep. 1502 (1978).
47. Payments may now be made (or ordered payed by the court) by either the husband
or the wife. See MCA § 40-4-203 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-322 (Supp.
1977)).
48. Property settlements, if partially in cash, may be paid immediately or over time
with interest. Hebel v. Hebel, - Mont. -. , 578 P.2d 305 (1978).
49. The question has arisen only twice under the UMDA in Montana. See Reilly v.
Reilly, - Mont. - , 577 P.2d 840 (1978); Johnsrud v. Johnsrud, - Mont. -, 572
P.2d 902 (1977). Once on appeal, however, it has always prompted a lengthy discussion by
the court.
50. MCA § 40-4-208 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-330 (Supp. 1977))
provides that "[a] property disposition may not be revoked or modified .. .except .. .
upon written consent or if the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening
of a judgement under the laws of this state." The supreme court held, prior to the UMDA,
that property settlements are not subject to subsequent modification. Washington v. Wash-
ington, 162 Mont. 349, 512 P.2d 1300 (1973). In 1978, the court cited Washington as authority
[Vol. 40
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also important tax considerations. 52
The property-maintenance confusion involves two interdepen-
dent issues: (1) how is maintenance distinguished from a property
settlement;5 and (2) how does a property disposition affect an order
for maintenance?
The Montana court appears to have answered the first ques-
tion. Both prior and subsequent to the passage of the UMDA, the
court has held that where periodic cash payments are supported by
consideration, such payments are part of the property disposition.
For example, if a wife gives up rights to certain property and future
support in exchange for monthly payments, such payments are part
of the property division and are not subject to subsequent modifica-
tion.55 Reilly added that if periodic payments are part of the prop-
erty division, they also constitute a contribution to the assets of a
subsequent marriage. 5
The uniform act attempted, in a dissolution proceedings, to
separate the division of property from an order for maintenance. 7
for the same position. Reilly v. Reilly, - Mont. -, 577 P.2d 840 (1978).
51. "Any decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified by a court upon
a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms
unconscionable, or if consented to in writing." MCA § 40-4-208 (1978) (formerly codified at
R.C.M. 1947, § 48-330 (Supp. 1977)).
52. See Comment, Federal Income Tax Consequences of Divorce and Separation, 16 J.
FAM. L. 779 (1978).
53. Montana has not distinguished settlement agreements, made by the parties and
approved by the court, from court-decreed dispositions and payments (used interchangeably
in this survey). Missouri and Washington, however, distinguish the two situations when
considering subsequent petitions for modification. Compare Vorhof v. Vorhof, 532 S.W.2d 830
(Mo. App. 1975) (periodic payments subject to modification if decreed by court, but not
subject to modification if contractual) with Thompsen v. Thompsen, 82 Wash.2d 352, 510
P.2d 827 (1973) (alimony subject to modification even if provided by contract; property
settlements, by contract or by decree of court not subject to modification).
54. Washington v. Washington, 162 Mont. 349, 512 P.2d 1300 (1973) ("alimony" ac-
tually part of property settlement); Taylor v. Taylor, 167 Mont. 164, 537 P.2d 483 (1975);
Johnsrud v. Johnsrud, - Mont. - , 572 P.2d 902 (1977).
55. Washington v. Washington, 162 Mont. 349, 512 P.2d 1300 (1973). Accord, Scott v.
Scott, 529 S.W.2d 656 (Ky. 1975). But see Movius v. Movius, 163 Mont. 463, 517 P.2d 884
(1974) ("alimony" subject to modification where not supported by consideration). Accord,
Carstens v. Carstens, 10 Wash. App. 964, 521 P.2d 840 (1974).
56. - Mont. at ___, 577 P.2d at 844.
57. Procedures and considerations for property dispositions and maintenance are set
out in separate sections. See MCA §§ 40-4-202, 203 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947,
§§ 48-321, 322 (Supp. 1977)). See also Commissioners' Note to UMDA § 308, 9 U.L.A. 494
(1973): "The dual intention of this section [on maintenance] and the section [on property
disposition] is to encourage the court to provide for the financial needs of the spouses by
property disposition rather than an award of maintenance. Only if the available property is
insufficient for the purpose and if the spouse who seeks maintenance is unable to secure
employment to his skills and interests or is occupied with child care may an award of mainte-
nance be ordered." See Johnsrud v. Johnsrud, - Mont -... 572 P.2d 902, 905
(1977).
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Justice Shea, in Johnsrud v. Johnsrud,58 explained the difference as
follows:
Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, there is a need to
distinguish between a property right in the marital estate, and the
maintenance provisions. Upon dissolution of the marriage the
property interests vests in the spouse to whom it is awarded. On
the other hand, an award of maintenance is related only to the
"needs" of the spouse seeking maintenance, and ceases, for exam-
ple, upon the happening of a certain event, such as death.59
He also explained how to make the distinction:
It is first the duty of the district court to equitably distribute the
marital property. After the court makes a decision on property
division, then any additional needs of a spouse petitioning for
maintenance should be readily apparent.0
Johnsrud sets out numerous examples of creative property set-
tlements. Many of these provide for a schedule of periodic cash
payments. While flexibility is desirable, poorly drawn agreements
and inadequately explained decrees may result in subsequent litiga-
tion when circumstances change and a former spouse seeks modifi-
cation."
The second question in the property-maintenance anomaly is
compounded by language in the UMDA. MCA § 40-4-202 (1978)62
states that a consideration in property division is whether the divi-
sion is "in lieu of or in addition to maintenance." Here, instead of
property being given up for maintenance, property is divided in lieu
of maintenance. To illustrate, a wife is awarded a larger share of the
marital estate than is the husband. The husband, in turn, is relieved
of paying maintenance to the wife. This appears satisfactory, but
difficulties arise when the wife's property award, typically the home
and furniture, cannot be readily liquidated. 3 Thus, she is without
income. Should the wife be awarded maintenance even though she
has received a disproportionately large share of the marital estate?
58. - Mont. -, 572 P.2d 902 (1977).
59. Id. at -' 572 P.2d at 906.
60. Id. at -, 572 P.2d at 905. This is an oversimplification. Computation of mainte-
nance and support provisions is the subject of numerous works of attorneys, judges, and
economists, all of whom appear to have their own formula for determining fair and adequate
payments. See, e.g., P. EDEN, ESTIMATING CHILD AND SPOUSAL SUPPOIrr (1977).
61. Again, the problem is determining whether cash payments are maintenance or are
part of the property settlement. See Johnrud v. Johnsrud, - Mont. _-, 572 P.2d 902
(1978); Taylor v. Taylor, 167 Mont. at 164, 537 P.2d at 483; Movius v. Movius, 163 Mont.
463, 517 P.2d 884 (1974); Washington v. Washington, 162 Mont. 349, 512 P.2d 1300 (1973);
Early v. Early, 6 Ariz. App. 10, 430 P.2d 456 (1967).
62. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-321 (Supp. 1977).
63. See, e.g., Cromwell v. Cromwell, - Mont. -, 570 P.2d 1129 (1977).
[Vol. 40
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This issue was raised in Cromwell v. Cromwell;6 however, the court
remanded that case for reconsideration without discussing the effect
of a property disposition on maintenance. 5 Thus, the second ques-
tion in regard to the property-maintenance confusion remains unre-
solved.
As complete a settlement as possible should be made solely
with the marital property to make the parties financially indepen-
dent of each other,"s following the instructions in Johnsrud. If cash
payments are part of the property settlement, this fact and the
consideration should be expressly stated. If maintenance is part of
the agreement, it should be separate and distinct from the para-
graphs dividing assets and liabilities. In considering maintenance
provisions, attorneys and clients alike must be cognizant that "more
property" does not always mean less need for financial support.
Spouses must not be overeager to bargain away maintenance pay-
ments to receive a more favorable property settlement. Mainte-
nance provisions should state (1) that payments are not a vested
interest, but are for the needs of the spouse receiving them; (2) when
payments are to begin and end; and (3) whether, and under what
circumstances, the schedule or amount of payments may be modi-
fied.
B. Maintenance, Support, and Modifications
The statutes authorizing periodic cash payments for the needs
of a former spouse and the children are set out in separate sections
of the UMDA as the considerations for each differ significantly." A
third section establishes the considerations for a modification of
maintenance or support. 8 Notwithstanding these separate statutory
considerations, Montana and other UMDA jurisdictions follow a
single theme with regard to periodic cash payments or their modifi-
cation. There must be a showing of need and a corresponding ability
of the other spouse to make payments."
64. - Mont. _ 570 P.2d 1129 (1977).
65. Id. at -, 570 P.2d at 1131. After reconsideration in district court, Cromwell was
appealed and reargued in November, 1978.
66. See Commissioners' Note to UMDA § 308, 9 U.L.A. 494 (1973). Such a simplistic
solution, however, appears to presume that each spouse, subsequent to dissolution, has an
equal earning power. Cf. Inker, Alimony and Assignment of Property: The New Statutory
Scheme in Massachusetts, 10 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 1 (1975) (each spouse on equal footing
respecting right to receive maintenance).
67. See MCA §§ 40-4-203 (maintenance) and 204 (child support) (1978) (formerly codi-
fied at R.C.M. 1947, §§ 48-322, 323 (Supp. 1977)).
68. MCA § 40-4-208 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-330 (Supp. 1977)).
69. Olsen v. Olsen,'- Mont. -, 574 P.2d 1004 (1977); Capener v. Capener, -
Mont. -, 582 P.2d 326 (1978); Burnette v. Burnette, 516 S.W.2d 330 (Ky. 1974); Hofstra
19791
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All of the cases to date have arisen from petitions for modifica-
tion, pursuant to MCA § 40-4-208 (1978),0 which provides:
The provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support
may be modified by a court only as to installments accruing subse-
quent to the motion for modification, and either (a) upon a show-
ing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to
make the terms unconscionable; or (b) upon written consent of the
parties.
Clearly, if the parties consent there is little problem. Yet, "changed
circumstances" and "unconscionable" are troublesome concepts to
define and apply."
1. Changed Circumstances
Montana has no ruling on what constitutes a change of circum-
stances. Anticipating that Montana will look to other jurisdictions
with similar statutes for authority, the following rules in other
UMDA jurisdictions may be relevant. For modifications of child
support, Colorado holds that remarriage, by itself, is not a sufficient
change of circumstances whether the petitioning spouse is making
or receiving payments." Nor is the increased wealth of the provider
a sufficient change. 3 The strongest facts warranting an increase in
payments are those in which expenses of the receiving spouse have
increased, such as from inflation, at the same time the providing
spouse's income has correspondingly increased."
From appeals on petitions to decrease or terminate payments,
Kentucky holds that the remarriage and incurring of a debt by the
provider is an insufficient change in circumstances. 5 In Missouri,
however, the provider's unemployment, when not imposed by
choice, is a sufficient change to warrant reducing the amount of
payments .7
v. Hofstra, 13 Ariz. App. 150, 474 P.2d 869 (1974); Dreyer v. Dreyer, 10 Wash. App. 624, 519
P.2d 12 (1974). Contra, Shive v. Shive, 57 Ill. App.3d 754, 373 N.E.2d 557 (1978).
70. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-330 (Supp. 1977).
71. The Proposed Revised Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, reprinted at 18 S.D. L.
REv. 693 (1973), promulgated by the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association,
deletes the word "unconscionable" from § 316, leaving a modification of maintenance and
support open to a court only upon a showing of a "real and substantial" change of circumstan-
ces.
72. See, e.g., Kinnamon v. Kinnamon, 532 P.2d 755 (Colo. App. 1975).
73. See, e.g., McGinley v. McGinley, 513 S.W.2d 471 (Mo. App. 1974).
74. See Hofstra v. Hofstra, 13 Ariz. Ap. 150, 474 P.2d 869 (1974); Smith v. Smith, 530
P.2d 966 (Colo. App. 1975); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 57 Ill. App.3d 958, 373 N.E.2d 829 (1978);
Alexander v. Alexander, 14 Wash. App. 222, 540 P.2d 457 (1975).
75. Burnette v. Burnette, 516 S.W.2d 330 (Ky. 1974).
76. Foster v. Foster, 537 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. App. 1976).
[Vol. 40
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The general trend appears to be a "bilateral change" require-
ment in the financial status of the parties. That is, the provider's
income and the recipient's expenses must both change in the same
direction before a court will grant a petition for modification.
2. Unconscionability
The Montana Supreme Court ruled, in the recent case of Green
v. Green,77 that it will not define "unconscionable."
We will follow the policy of determining on a case to case basis,
from the underlying facts, whether the evidence is sufficient to be
unconscionable. We thereby avoid the possibility of adopting too
harsh a standard on one hand, and too lenient a standard on the
other, which might later circumvent the policy of the legislature
in adopting [MCA § 40-4-208 (1978)]."M
Kentucky, however, defines unconscionable as "manifestly unfair or
inequitable."7 Colorado holds that, absent fraud, overreaching, or
an applicable reservation of authority, a court has no power to mo-
dify an order for maintenance."0 Even without guidelines, the Mon-
tana court emphatically requires the petitioning spouse to allege
facts showing the necessity for modification.81
C. Summary
Appeals in marriage and divorce litigation have been more
numerous in the last three years than immediately prior to the
UMDA's enactment. In some cases, the supreme court has given the
act its intended interpretation, as in prohibiting fault considera-
tions from entering a dissolution proceeding. In other areas, how-
ever, the court has been slow or has avoided statutory interpreta-
tion. To date, Montana still lacks rulings on what constitutes a
change of circumstances for modification of maintenance and sup-
port, what guidelines should be used in considering inheritance, and
what effect a property disposition should have on maintenance. The
court declined to define "unconscionability," a necessary element
of proof in a modification proceeding. Clearly, in its third year be-
fore the supreme court, the UMDA is still subject to considerable
interpretation.
77. - Mont. -, 579 P.2d 1235 (1978).
78. Id. at __, 579 P.2d at 1238-39.
79. Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, 506 S.W.2d 511 (Ky. 1974).
80. Beebe v. Beebe, 526 P.2d 1348 (Colo. App. 1974) (one party not represented by
counsel does not render a decree unconscionable).
81. Lehman v. Billman, - Mont. -, 584 P.2d 662 (1978).
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Ill. PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS
Issues concerning parent-child relationships addressed by the
Montana Supreme Court during the October 1977-October 1978 pe-
riod fall into four major categories: (1) custody of a child following
dissolution of marriage, (2) custody of a child who is a youth in need
of care, (3) licensing of persons placing children for adoption, and
(4) due process rights of a youth in a predetention hearing. The
cases primarily involve consideration of the trial court's discretion
in determining the child's best interest, and interpretation of some
especially troublesome sections of the UMDA and Montana laws on
child abuse, neglect, and dependency. The statutes are relatively
new: as already mentioned," the UMDA was enacted in 1975, and
the act for abused, dependent, and neglected youth in 1974.
This section provides an overview of recent additions to the law,
but also highlights problem areas within the statutes and points out
what appear to be common analytical and procedural errors of attor-
neys. The organization generally follows the sequence of sections in
the statutes. Comparisons with cases from other jurisdictions are
made when appropriate.
A. Child Custody: Dissolution
1. Jurisdiction
Strouf v. Stroufm is only the third Montana case to apply what
is now MCA § 40-4-211 (1978),u which outlines the circumstances
in which a district court has jurisdiction over child custody matters
following a dissolution of marriage. Prior to Strouf the court had
stated that according to that section, the district court had jurisdic-
tion when the child resided in Montana at the time the custody
proceeding was commenced,e but did not have jurisdiction when
the legal custodian resided in another state and the children were
in the state only after their non-custodial parent had seized them
and fled to his home in Montana." In Strouf, the supreme court held
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction when the child was lawfully
present in Montana as the result of the exercise of the non-custodial
parent's temporary visitation rights. The opinion emphasizes that,
except in cases in which the child has been abandoned, in which
82. See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
83. - Mont. -, 578 P.2d 746 (1978).
84. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-331 (Supp. 1977). Subsections (1) and (2)
correspond almost exactly to § 401(a) and (b) of the UMDA, 9 U.L.A. 502-03 (1973).
85. Ronchetto v. Ronchetto, - Mont. _ _ 567 P.2d 456, 458 (1977).
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there is an emergency to protect the child from abuse, neglect, or
dependency, or in which another state has jurisdiction, the mere
physical presence of a child in Montana is not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on a Montana court to hear a proceeding concerning
child custody following dissolution."
Once a district court has jurisdiction over a child custody mat-
ter, its power to enforce its judgment is retained until the judgment
is reversed, modified, or vacated by the supreme court. Thus, in
Kramer v. Kramer," although the case was in the process of being
appealed, the district court still had the power to order a writ of
habeas corpus to have the children returned to their mother.
2. Initial Custody Proceeding
a. Best Interest of Child
Custody of a child following dissolution of marriage is deter-
mined in Montana according to the best interest of the child. 9 MCA
§ 40-4-212 (1978)0 provides that in determining the best interest of
the child the court shall consider all relevant factors, including (1)
wishes of the parents; (2) wishes of the child; (3) interaction and
interrelationships of the child with his parents, siblings, and any
other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
A case of significant import in the area of the child's best inter-
est is In re Kramer.' While the court had stated in previous cases
that consideration of the child's wishes in a custody proceeding is
mandatory, in Kramer the court went further and held that the trial
judge must make a specific finding stating the wishes of the children
as to their custodian, and, that if the court determined a custody
arrangement contrary to the wishes of the children, it must state in
its findings the basis for that determination. 2 During the course of
87. In Graton v. Graton, 24 Ariz. App. 194, 537 P.2d 31 (1975), and Hawley v. Shaver,
528 S.W.2d 669 (Ky. 1975), the Arizona and Kentucky courts in two cases on point decided
the issue the same way. In addition, it should be noted that MCA § 41-3-103 (1978) (formerly
codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1302(1) (Supp. 1977)), the jurisdiction section of the act for
abused, dependent, and neglected youth, provides that the youth court has concurrent juris-
diction with the district courts over all youths who are within the state for any purpose.
88. - Mont. -, 578 P.2d 317 (1978).
89. See MCA § 40-4-212 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-332 (Supp.
1977)); Allen v. Allen, __ Mont. __, 575 P.2d 74 (1978); In re Kramer, - Mont. -,
-, 580 P.2d 439, 444 (1978).
90. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-332 (Supp. 1977).
91. - Mont. __, 580 P.2d 439 (1978).
92. Id. at -, 580 P.2d at 444. The instructions are consistent with Rule 52, MoNT.
R. Civ. P., which provides that the court shall make findings specially and state its conclu-
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the proceeding, the children had let it be known on three separate
occasions, both on and off the record, that they wanted to live with
their father, but the court made no mention of the wishes of the
children in its findings of fact, and the mother was awarded custody
of the children. The case was remanded.
In another significant case, Schiele v. Sager,9 3 the court found
that under what is now MCA § 40-4-212(3) (1978),11 reputation evi-
dence concerning the violent conduct of the petitioner's present
spouse was relevant and admissable as evidence affecting his rela-
tionship with the child. The decision is not inconsistent with the
court's previous opinions in which evidence of misconduct that did
not affect the relationship of a custodian with the child was held
inadmissable.
5
b. Court Interviews with Child
A judge may interview a child in chambers to ascertain his
wishes regarding custody, as provided in MCA § 40-4-215(1)
(1978)." In Schiele v. Sager97 and Easton v. Easton"8 the court re-
peated its earlier holdings that such interviews are discretionary on
the part of the district judge, but pointed out in Schiele that once
the interview is called, it is mandatory that the interview be re-
corded and included in the case record. 9 Subsequently, the court
held in Lehman v. Billman'0 that the right to the interview being
recorded and put on the record can be waived by the parties so long
as the waiver is voluntary and intentional.
c. Representation of Child and District Court Practice
In In re Kramerol the supreme court articulated the role the
court-appointed attorney should play in representing children in a
custody matter under what is now MCA § 40-4-205 (1978).102 In that
case, the attorney did not attend the dissolution hearing, even
though substantial evidence relating to the best interests of the
sions of law thereon separately, and with the holding of the Colorado court when it faced a
similar issue in In re Jaramillo, 543 P.2d 1281 (Colo. App. 1975).
93. - Mont. - -, 571 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1977).
94. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-332(3) (Supp. 1977).
95. Solie v. Solie, - Mont. _ 561 P.2d 443 (1977); Foss v. Leifer, 170 Mont. 97,
550 P.2d 1309 (1976).
96. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-331(1) (Supp. 1977).
97. - Mont. - __, 571 P.2d 1142, 1145 (1977).
98. - Mont. 574 P.2d 989, 993 (1978).
99. - Mont. at , 571 P.2d at 1145.
100. - Mont. , -, 584 P.2d 662, 665 (1978).
101. - Mont. __, __, 580 P.2d 439, 445 (1978).
102. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-324 (Supp. 1977).
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children was presented. Nor did he attend the in camera interview
with the children. The mother received custody of the children even
though they had expressed a preference to live with their father. The
attorney did question witnesses at a hearing on a motion for a new
trial, but he took no position as to which parent would make the best
custodian in terms of the best interest of the children.
The court declared that the purpose of what is now § 40-4-205
is to "provide the children with an advocate who will represent their
interests and not the parents' interest."'' 3 This means the attorney
should "represent the children actively [at the hearing] and pres-
ent to the court all the evidence he can marshal concerning the best
interest of the children.' '0 4 The court found error in holding the
hearing on the child custody issue without the presence of the chil-
dren's attorney and remanded the case. Thus, the court considers
it crucial to the determination of the child's best interest that an
attorney appointed to represent a child in a custody hearing be an
active and independent participant in the proceedings.
d. Investigation and Report
MCA §40-4-215 (1978)10 provides that in a contested custody
hearing the court may order the county welfare department to make
an investigation and report concerning the proposed custodial ar-
rangements. The court must mail the investigator's report to coun-
sel and to any party not represented by counsel at least ten days
prior to the hearing, and the investigator must make his files avail-
able to counsel or any unrepresented party. Any party has the right
to call the investigator and any person whom he has consulted for
cross-examination at the hearing, and this right cannot be waived
prior to the hearing.
(1) Distribution of Report and the Right to Cross Examine.
The court pointed out in Schiele v. Sager,'°0 that it is within the
judge's discretion whether to order an investigation or not. In Allen
v. Allen,'07 the trial court ordered that an investigation be under-
taken. The order had been given in response to a request by the
father made late in the trial. There was no timely motion for contin-
uance. An investigation followed and a copy of the report was filed
with the court prior to its entering of the decree, but no copy was
mailed to the father's counsel as required by § 40-4-215(3). Custody
was awarded to the mother. The father contended that the district
103. - Mont. at -, 580 P.2d at 445.
104. Id.
105. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-335 (Supp. 1977).
106. - Mont. at -, 571 P.2d at 1146.
107. - Mont. , -, 575 P.2d 74, 76 (1978).
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court's judgment concerning child custody should be vacated be-
cause he did not receive a copy of the investigator's report, and was
therefore unable to cross-examine the investigator and offer rebut-
ting evidence. The supreme court disagreed and said that since the
father did not request the investigation to be made until after testi-
mony concerning the children's welfare and did not submit a timely
motion for continuance, the judgment should be affirmed.
The supreme court has frequently cited the Commissioners'
Notes to the uniform act as an appropriate guideline for interpreta-
tion of the Montana UMDA. The Commissioners' Note to § 405 of
the uniform act, subsections (a) and (b) which are identical to Mon-
tana's § 40-4-215(1) and (2), states that the section's purpose is to
"assure that investigations will be conducted with due regard to fair
hearing values, while encouraging investigators to provide accurate
information to the court."'"
In Lewis v. Lewis, '19 the Kentucky court construed an identical
statute in similar circumstances, but reached a contrary result. The
court granted a dissolution decree, but withheld determination of
custody pending an investigation into the parties' new home situa-
tions following their remarriages. The opinion does not state
whether either party submitted a motion for continuance of the
trial. No report was sent to the parties' attorneys, and no hearing
was held prior to the entering of the judgment awarding custody to
the mother. The father maintained that the court erred in not fol-
lowing the procedures outlined in subsection (3) of the statute. The
court agreed with his contention, saying that the father had a statu-
tory right to examine the report and the underlying file and to cross-
examine the investigator. Since his right could not be waived prior
to a hearing and there had been no hearing, the father still retained
the right. The case was remanded to allow the father to cross-
examine the investigator at an evidentiary hearing. The court
stressed that by allowing the report to be fully explored, the district
court would thereby be more fully informed as to which parent
would be the best custodian.
The Commissioners' Note and Lewis stress fundamental fair-
ness of the evidentiary hearing on child custody. In Lewis, the Ken-
tucky court considered it mandatory that a supplemental hearing
be held following a receipt of the investigator's report. The Montana
court distinguished Allen from Lewis on the basis of the father's late
request for the court order. The court order in Lewis, however, was
also made after the testimony concerning the children's welfare had
108. Commissioners' Note to UMDA § 405, 9 U.L.A. 508 (1973).
109. 534 S.W.2d 800 (Ky. 1976).
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been heard. Perhaps a distinguishing factor is whether the trial
judge or a party initiated the court order. In Lewis, in which the
court initiated the order, the Kentucky court appears to have placed
greater value on the hearing of all available evidence. In Allen, in
which a party requested the order, the Montana court appears to
have placed the greater value on proper procedure. The result in
Montana could be very harsh where the future well-being of a child
is at stake.
Based on its opinion in Allen, the Montana court apparently
expects a request for a court order for an investigation to be submit-
ted well before the hearing date. If the request is submitted during
the trial, the requesting party must also submit a motion for contin-
uance. The motion must be granted in order to ensure the request-
ing party's right to cross-examine the investigator or any of his
informants, or to offer evidence to rebut the report."0
(2) Is the Report Hearsay? In In re Kramer,"' the supreme
court affirmed its decision in the leading case of In re Swan"2 and
declared that the investigator's report is hearsay and therefore
should be excluded as evidence. But the court went on to point out
that, according to what is now MCA § 40-4-215(2) (1978),"3 the
report could be received as evidence if the requirements of § 40-4-
215(3)1" were met. Those requirements are that the court mail a
copy of the report to counsel and to any party not represented by
counsel; that the investigator make his underlying file available to
counsel and to any party not represented by counsel, and that either
party has the right to cross-examine the investigator and any of his
informants. In Kramer, the district court excluded the investigator's
report as hearsay and limited the investigator's testimony to her
opinion regarding the best suited parent. The supreme court held
that the report's exclusion and the limitation on testimony was
error, and remanded the case for a new trial.
3. Modification of Custody Following Dissolution
The modification of child custody statute, MCA § 40-4-219
110. The decision appears to be in conflict with Rule 614(a) of the MoNT. R. Evw.,
which provides that "The court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a party, call
witnesses and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus called." Based on the
ruling of Ronchetto v. Ronchetto, - Mont. - -, 567 P.2d 456, 458 (1977), decided
by the court prior to Allen, it also appears that the supreme court has allowed the district
court to consider hearsay evidence.
111. -. Mont. at -, 580 P.2d at 444.
112. - Mont. -, 567 P.2d 898, 900 (1977). Kramer, - Mont. at -, 580 P.2d
at 444, also followed the rule as announced in the more recent case, Ronchetto v. Ronchetto,
Mont. - , 567 P.2d 456 (1977).
113. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-335(2) (Supp. 1977).
114. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-335(3) (Supp. 1977).
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(1978),111 is perhaps the most problematical statute that the su-
preme court has dealt with in the area of parent-child relationships.
The statute is a change from pre-UMDA law, and in interpreting
the new statute, the court has construed the language very strictly.
The terms appearing in the statute lend themselves to diverse defi-
nitions, however, and the court is just beginning the process of inter-
preting meanings of words and phrases. Because the statute is new
and unexplored, many attorneys handling custody modifications
have made errors fatal to their cases.
Subsection (1) of the statute provides that when modification
of custody is sought during the first two years following the custody
decree, the petitioner must submit an affidavit containing facts
which show that the child's present environment may seriously en-
danger his physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.
Subsection (2) provides that there shall be no modification of
custody in any case unless there are:
(1) changed circumstances relating to the custodial parent or to
the child, and
(2) given the existence of one of the following three circumstan-
ces, the best interest of the child is served by modification:
(a) the custodian agrees to modification, or
(b) the child has been integrated into the family of the peti-
tioner with the consent of the custodian, or
(c) the child's present environment seriously endangers his
physical, mental, moral, or emotional health, and the harm
of a change in custody is outweighed by the advantage of a
change in custody.
The court's interpretation of the statute's purpose was first
expressed in Holm v. Holm, "I in which the court adopted this state-
ment of the commissioners of the uniform act: "This section is de-
signed to maximize finality (and thus assure continuity for the
child) without jeopardizing the child's interest."'11 The statute
makes it very difficult to modify custody, especially during the first
two years following the decree, but does provide for a "safety value"
for emergency situations. In recent cases, the court continues to
adhere strongly to the evaluation of the commissioners that the
finality of the custody decree is of greater importance to the best
interest of the child than the determination of which parent should
have custody."8
115. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-339 (Supp. 1977).
116. - Mont. -, -, 560 P.2d 905, 908 (1977).
117. Commissioners' Note to UMDA § 409, 9 U.L.A. 512 (1973).
118. See, e.g., Easton v. Easton, __Mont. -, -, 574 P.2d 989, 993 (1978).
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As in pre-UMDA cases, the best interest of the child in UMDA
cases is the primary consideration of the court;"' however, in re-
sponse to the new statute, the court has altered its concept of what
it considers to be in the best interest of the child. There is now, in
effect, a rebuttable presumption that it is in the best interest of the
child that the custody decree be final. The presumption can be
rebutted by showing the existence of the circumstances listed in
subsection (2) if the petition for modification is submitted more
than two years following the initial decree, or those listed in subsec-
tions (1) and (2) if the petition is submitted less than two years
following the decree. In UMDA cases prior to and during the
October-October period, subsections (1) and (2) and the subsections
thereof were held to be jurisdictional prerequisites to petitions for
modification of custody decrees.'"
The topics in the following parts of this section present problem
areas within the custody modification statute to which the court
addressed itself during the October-October period. Complicating
analysis of the cases is the fact that the court has not yet found it
necessary to define "custody" or "custodial parent." It has used the
terms inconsistently to refer either to the legal custodian or to the
parent in physical possession of the child at the time the petition is
submitted. To avoid that confusion, the term "custody" (and its
derivatives) refers here only to the responsibility for the child's care
and welfare entrusted to a parent by a court of law.
a. "Jurisdictional Prerequisites" to Modification within Two
Years
In the leading case of Holm v. Holm, '2 the court recognized
that according to what is now MCA § 40-4-219 (1978),122 there is a
double requirement for a custody modification petition submitted
during the two-year period following the custody decree. The Holm
analytical mode has been the standard followed by the court in most
subsequent cases.'23 In the recent cases of Olson v. Olson,'24 and
119. In re Dallenger, - Mont. , ,568 P.2d 169, 172 (1977); Gianotti v. Mc-
Cracken, - Mont. -, 569 P.2d 929, 932 (1977); Schiele v. Sager, - Mont. __,
-, 571 P.2d 1142, 1145 (1977).
120. See Holm v. Holm,__ Mont. -, - 560 P.2d 905, 908 (1977); In re Dallen-
ger, - Mont. -, _ 568 P.2d 169, 172 (1977); Gianotti v. McCracken, - Mont.
, 569 P.2d 929, 931-32 (1977); Schiele v. Sager, - Mont. -, - 571 P.2d 1142,
1145 (1977).
121. - Mont. at -, 560 P.2d at 907-08.
122. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-339 (Supp. 1977).
123. In Easton v. Easton, __ Mont. -, -, 574 P.2d 989, 992 (1978), the statute
was incorrectly cited as prohibiting modification of the custody decree within two years after
entry unless the requirements of subsection (2)(c) alone were met. It is possible that by
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Strouf v. Strouf '2 for example, the court found that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction when the petitioner did not file the affidavit
required in subsection (1)121 and when the affidavit filed did not
contain facts sufficient to show that the child's present environment
seriously endangered his physical, mental, moral, or emotional
health. 27
b. "Present Environment"
The court has either implied or specifically defined the term
"present environment" under MCA § 40-4-219(1) and (2)(c)
(1978)128 to refer both to the child's immediate surroundings at the
time the petition for custody modification is submitted,12 and to
what his surroundings were while with the parent not in possession
of the aild at the time the petition is submitted.'13 Despite the
apparent inconsistencies, however, as the court has applied the
term, "present environment" can be understood consistently to
refer to "present legal custody arrangement" rather than to the
present, immediate surroundings of the child. In all cases, what the
court appears to have considered in the end is the arrangement the
custodial parent has made for the care of the child, whether that
arrangement included retaining possession of the child or giving
temporary possession of the child to the non-custodial parent or
another relative.
The recent case of Hamilton v. Hamilton3' is especially reveal-
ing. In Hamilton, the court explicitly stated that the child's
"present environment" was that which he was experiencing while
in the possession of his father, the non-custodial parent, during the
period the father petitioned for modification.' 32 Since there was no
showing that the child's environment with the father seriously en-
dangered him, the trial court was held to have lacked jurisdiction
to hear the petition to modify custody. But then the supreme court
went on to consider that the father had made no allegations con-
cerning what the child's environment would be if returned to the
possession of his mother, the custodial parent. Since there were no
meeting the requirements of subsection (2)(c), the requirements of subsections (1) and
(2)-the correct prerequisites-would be met, but that is not necessarily the case.
124. - Mont. -, 574 P.2d 1004 (1978).
125. __ Mont. __. 578 P.2d 746 (1978).
126. Olson v. Olson, - Mont. at -, 574 P.2d at 1007.
127. Strouf v. Strouf,__ Mont. at -, 578 P.2d at 748.
128. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-339(1) and (2)(c) (Supp. 1977).
129. Weber v. Weber, __ Mont. -, 578 P.2d 1102 (1978).
130. Groves v. Groves, __ Mont. -, -, 567 P.2d 459, 463 (1977).
131. - Mont. -, 580 P.2d 104 (1978).
132. Id. at -, 580 P.2d at 106.
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facts offered to show that that environment would seriously endan-
ger the child, the trial court was held also to have lacked jurisdiction
to modify custody on that basis.'1
c. "Change in Circumstances"
The "change in circumstances" in MCA § 40-4-219(2) (1978),1 34
is a term of art defined by the court to refer to circumstances
changed so substantially that the best interests and general welfare
of the child can be promoted by alteration of the decree.'3 In Weber
v. Weber, 3 the court said that a change in the custodial parent's
health which was serious enough to require out-of-state medical
treatment over a period of a few months was not a change substan-
tial enough to require modification of the custody decree under § 40-
4-219(2)(b) and (c).
d. "Integration into Petitioner's Family"
In Weber,"'3 a child had been left by the custodial parent, the
mother, in the care of the father temporarily while she sought out-
of-state medical treatment and subsequently to enable the child to
attend school in the father's community. The court found that the
child had not been integrated into the petitioning father's family so
as to meet the requirements for modification of custody under what
is now MCA § 40-4-219(2)(b) (1978),13 because the mother had not
consented to the father retaining permanent custody. Instead, upon
the filing of the petition for modification, the mother sought a tem-
porary restraining order and the child was returned to her.
e. Affidavits
According to MCA § 40-4-220 (1978),'' a crucial step in peti-
tioning for modification of a custody decree is the submission of an
affidavit setting forth facts which support the jurisdictional prere-
quisites of the appropriate subsections of MCA § 40-4-219 (1978).140
As mentioned above, in Olson, "I Hamilton, 1"2 and Strouf,"43 the peti-
133. Id.
134. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-339(2) (Supp. 1977).
135. See Foss v. Leifer, 170 Mont. 97, 101, 550 P.2d 1309, 1311 (1976).
136. - Mont. -, -, 576 P.2d 1102, 1104 (1978).
137. Id. at -, 576 P.2d at 1103-04.
138. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-339(2)(b) (Supp. 1977).
139. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-340 (Supp. 1977).
140. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-339 (Supp. 1977).
141. - Mont. at - 574 P.2d at 1007.
142. - Mont. at -, 580 P.2d at 106.
143. - Mont. at __, 578 P.2d at 748.
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tioners either did not submit the prescribed affidavit, or the affida-
vit they did submit did not set forth facts supporting the requested
modification. All three petitioners lost their cases, in part at least,
because of that neglect.
In Strouf, " the court pointed out that the affidavit statute
requires that three steps be taken before a court has jurisdiction to
issue an order to show cause. Although not set out in the case, based
on the structure of the statute, the steps must be: (1) the petitioner
must file the affidavit; (2) the petitioner must give notice and a copy
of the affidavit to the opposing party, who may respond thereto by
his own affidavit; and (3) the court must find that adequate cause
for hearing the motion is established by the affidavits. In Strouf, the
petitioner neglected to give notice, and as a result, the order to show
cause was vacated.
4. Modification of Visitation Rights
The Montana court apparently considers visitation and custody
to be relative matters, that is, that visitation over an extended
period-two months, for example-is the equivalent of custody. In
Olson,' the district court had modified the decree so that the chil-
dren remained year-round in the custody of the father, but the
mother's visitation rights were extended to include the period from
June 15 through August 15 of every year and every other Christmas
vacation. The modification of the decree took place less than two
years after the initial decree. The supreme court determined that
the district court had modified the custody decree rather than the
mother's visitation rights, and that the mother's petition thus had
to meet the requirements of what is now MCA § 40-4-219(1)
(1978).111 The court declared, "Labeling this 'visitation' does not
change its substance which is 'custody.' ,,'47
B. Child Custody: Youth in Need of Care
Montana's act for abused, neglected, and dependent youth was
enacted in order to further the state's policy to "ensure that all
youth are afforded an adequate physical and emotional environ-
ment to promote normal development," and in proper cases "to
144. Id.
145. - Mont. _ 574 P.2d 1004 (1978).
146. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 48-339(1) (Supp. 1977).
147. - Mont. at -, 574 P.2d at 1007. As was noted by the Montana court, the
Colorado court in Manson v. Manson, 35 Colo. App. 144, 529 P.2d 1345 (1974), held that an
identical statute does not apply to the modification of visitation rights. In Manson, the
mother had custody of the children under the decree for the entire year and had petitioned
to have the father's visitation rights substantially decreased.
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compel ... the parent or guardian of a youth to perform the moral
and legal duty owed to the youth.""' Under the act, the best interest
of the child remains the paramount consideration in all cases of
child abuse, neglect, or dependency;" 9 whenever possible, however,
the protection of the child's health and welfare is to be achieved in
a family environment, and the unity and welfare of the family is to
be preserved.150
1. Best Interest of Child
During the October-October period, the court held in In re
Doney,151 and In re G., 112 that a finding of dependency, abuse, or
neglect of a child is a prerequisite to an application of the "best
interest of the child test" in determining child custody. In In re G., 113
and In re J.J.S., 5' the court also reaffirmed that the legislative
policy to preserve the unity and welfare of the family will prevail
only when there is no proof of the neglect of the child.
2. Appointment of Counsel to Represent Indigent Parents
In re M.D. YR. 5  is the first Montana case in which due process
and equal protection have been raised as factors to be considered
in the interpretation of what is now MCA § 41-3-401(12) (1978).1"6
In that case an indigent mother argued that the initial temporary
custody hearing in a dependency and neglect proceeding is a crucial
and formative stage of the permanent custody proceeding, and that
because she was not appointed counsel at the temporary custody
hearing, she was denied equal protection and her rights and inter-
ests were prejudiced at a formative stage in the litigation.
MCA § 41-3-401(12) (1978) provides that "The court may at
any time on its own motion or the motion of any party appoint a
guardian ad litem for the youth or counsel for any indigent party."
In M.D. YR. the court pointed out that appointment of counsel for
an indigent party is a matter of discretion for the trial judge. The
court elaborated on the statutory language, however, and held that
148. MCA § 41-3-101(1) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1300(1) (Supp.
1977)).
149. In re G., -Mont.-, , 570 P.2d 1110, 1114 (1977); In reJ.J.S.,- Mont.
__ 577 P.2d 378, 381 (1978).
150. MCA § 41-3-101(1)(c) and (d) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 10-
1300(3) and (4) (Supp. 1977)).
151. - Mont. -, , 570 P.2d 575, 578 (1977).
152. - Mont. 570 P.2d 1110, 1113.
153. Id. at -, 570 P.2d at 1114.
154. - Mont... -, 577 P.2d 378, 382 (1978).
155. - Mont. , 582 P.2d 758 (1978).
156. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1310(12) (Supp. 1977).
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although an indigent parent is not always entitled to an appoint-
ment of counsel in a dependent-neglect custody hearing, he is enti-
tled in each case to a judicial decision as to his right to counsel.
Furthermore, if that decision is to deny counsel, the district court
must state its grounds for refusal in the records. Adopting a Ninth
Circuit court rule, the Montana court held that the prescribed judi-
cial decision must be made "whenever the indigent parent, unable
to present his or her case properly, faces a substantial possibility of
the loss of custody or prolonged separation from the child."'' 7
Although the court did not require the district court in
M.D. YR. to comply with its newly declared requirement of a judi-
cial decision, it did find that the indigent mother had not been
deprived of equal protection or due process. The court's decision was
based on the facts that the child would have been returned to the
mother at any time the Department of Social and Rehabilitation
Services personnel (hereinafter SRS) were reasonably certain that
the child would not be neglected, and that the mother had opposed
neither the custody of the child by SRS nor the program of educa-
tion in child rearing skills that had been proposed for the mother
by SRS. Indeed, the court points out, the appellant's motion to
dismiss and vacate the order of temporary custody had even been
granted by the district court almost a year after the motion had
been made and just prior to ordering the petition for permanent
custody to be heard. The court summarily dismissed as speculative
the appellant's argument that being deprived of child custody under
the temporary order adversely affected her relationship with the
child so as to influence the decision in the permanent child custody
hearing.
3. Appointment of Counsel to Represent Minor Child
a. Abuse of Discretion
The rule of Stubben v. Flathead County Dept. of Welfare,'58
that appointment of counsel to represent a minor child in depend-
ency proceedings is not mandatory, but within the discretion of the
court,'15 has recently been modified in two cases. In In re Gullette, '"
decided just prior to the period of this survey, the Montana court
had held that "where the custody [of a child] is in serious dispute,
the court shall appoint independent counsel for the child or make a
finding stating the reasons such appointment was unnecessary." In
157. - Mont. at __, 582 P.2d at 765.
158. - Mont. -, 556 P.2d 904 (1976).
159. Id. at _-, 556 P.2d at 905.
160. - Mont. -, 566 P.2d 396 (1977).
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In re J.J.S., the court ruled that "the appointment of counsel is only
necessary when the child needs an advocate to represent his position
as to the issues in dispute or to ensure the development of an ade-
quately complete record concerning the best interests of the
child."'' The supreme court found that the trial court was not re-
quired to follow the directives of Gullette because J.J.S. was heard
by the trial court prior to the Gullette decision, but stated that the
trial court had not abused its discretion in this case because: (1) the
child was too young (twenty-two months) to formulate and express
an opinion as to the issues involved, and (2) the record of the hearing
was adequate to determine the best interest of the child.
b. Denial of Due Process
In In re M.D. Y.R., also heard by the trial court prior to the
Gullette decision, the court was faced with the question of whether
the indigent parent and the twenty-month old child were denied due
process because the district court had not appointed independent
counsel for either of them. Expanding upon its Gullette rule, the
court adopted the Ninth Circuit rule to apply also to the right of a
child involved in a child custody case."' M.D. Y.R. extends the re-
quirements of Gullette so that in every child custody hearing the
district court is required to make a judicial decision regarding the
necessity of an appointment of counsel for the child, and if the
decision is not to appoint such counsel, the court must state in the
record the reasons for its decision. Additionally, the court ruled in
Schiele v. Sager, 'I that if counsel for the child is appointed by the
trial court, that counsel must be independent.
C. Adoption: Licensing of Person Placing Children
The rights of an obstetrician-gynecologist and an attorney to
serve jointly as middlemen between unwed mothers and couples
desiring to adopt were examined in Montana Department of Social
and Rehabilitation Services v. Angel. " The supreme court held that
by placing children for adoption, the physician was acting as an
adoption agency within the meaning of what is now MCA § 53-4-
402 (1978),115 and that therefore he was required to obtain a li-
cense.' 6 The decision, in effect, may close the door to practicing
physicians arranging adoptions in Montana since MCA § 53-4-
161. - Mont. at , 557 P.2d at 381.
162. - Mont. at -, 582 P.2d at 765.
163. - Mont. at , 571 P.2d at 1146.
164. - Mont. , 577 P.2d 1223 (1978).
165. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 10-702.
166. - Mont. at -, 577 P.2d at 1225.
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404(2) (1978)67 requires an adoption agency to be nonprofit before
it can obtain a license.
D. Youth Court: Rights of a Youth in a Predetention Hearing
In re Marten, I is the first case to interpret what is now MCA
§ 41-5-102(4) (1978)169 which provides that the purpose of the Mon-
tana Youth Court Act is to provide judicial procedures in which a
youth is assured a fair hearing and recognition and enforcement of
his constitutional and statutory rights. In this case, the court held
that whether to hold a predetention hearing is a matter for the
court's discretion, and further, that in a predetention hearing, it is
not error to deny the assistance of available counsel to the youth
when the attorney's identity as the youth's counsel is not known to
a certainty by the court. The attorney had been present at the
hearing and requested to address the court on a matter pertinent to
the issue at hand, but was not allowed to do so until after the judge
had issued the detention order. The court also held that it was
proper to hold the youth in detention over the weekend prior to
hearing charges against him, since his parents could not be located
and the family with whom he had been living, although willing to
assume responsibility for the youth, was not a licensed foster care
home. Justice Shea dissented on the ground that the hearing was
devoid of procedural rights. 70
E. Summary
In summary, significant changes in the law regarding parent-
child relationships have generally taken the form of refinement of
definition of statutory terms and the addition of new procedural
rules. From cases heard during the October 1977-October 1978 sur-
vey period, the following new rules and problem areas can be identi-
fied:
In regard to child custody following dissolution, the attorney
should be aware that, absent jurisdiction by another state or an
emergency situation involving abuse, dependency, neglect, or aban-
donment, the mere presence of the child in Montana is not sufficient
to give jurisdiction to a Montana court. It is mandatory that a court
consider the child's wishes as to the custody arrangement and that
any in camera interview with the child be entered in the record,
unless the record requirement is waived by the parties. A party's
167. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 10-703(2).
168. - Mont. -, 570 P.2d 1122 (1977).
169. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1202(4) (Supp. 1977).
170. - Mont. at - , 570 P.2d at 1127.
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request for an investigation and report by the county welfare depart-
ment should be made prior to the hearing, and the investigator must
be examined on the stand in order for the report to be admitted as
evidence. Any attorney appointed to be counsel for a child in a
custody hearing is expected to represent his client actively.
In regard to modification of custody, the "jurisdictional prere-
quisites" for a hearing on a petition to modify a custody decree must
be met to the letter. It is especially important to remember that a
petition to modify a custody decree during the two-year prohibition
period must meet the special requirements: the submission of an
affidavit containing facts which show that the child's present envi-
ronment seriously endangers his moral, emotional, physical, or
mental health. The court's definitions of terms in the custody modi-
fication statute are non-existent or inconsistent. For example, the
court's use of the terms "custody" and "present environment" can
be particularly troublesome, and a lengthy extension of visitation
rights is considered to be a modification of custody.
In regard to abused, dependent, and neglected youth, the attor-
ney should be aware that in a custody hearing the court must make
a judicial decision as to the right to court-appointed counsel of any
indigent parent or a child old enough to appreciate the situation and
express himself.
In relation to the adoption statutes, a person placing children
for adoption must be licensed as an adoption agency. Finally, under
the Youth Court Act, the supreme court appears not to be willing
to go to great lengths to assure a youth of his constitutional rights
in a predetention hearing.
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